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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district cou~i's Order Granting Defendants' Motioil for Summary 
li~dginent. Appellant William Lightner is an Idaho state prisoner. Appellant Marcia Lightner is his 
wife. The Lightners filed this actiou pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, alleging that their constitutioi~al 
rights were violated when Idaho Department of Correction ("DOC") officials terminated Mrs. 
Lightner's visiting privileges 
B. Procedural History 
The Lightners initially filed their Civil Rights Coinplaint on January 14, 2008. (R., p. 7). 
Responde~lts filed an Answer and Jury De~nand on February 5,2008. (R., p. 21). On June 12, 
2008, the district coiirt granted the Lightners' request to anleild their Complaint. (See R., p. 3). 
The Lightners then filed their Amended Civil Rights Colnplaiilt 011 June 16, 2008. (R., p. 31). 
The primary pui-pose of the ainendnle~lt was to disiniss Defendants Blades, I<irltma~~, McIntire, 
Amersfoot, and Greenland; while adding Defendant Reieinl. (Conzpare R., p. 7 and p. 31; see 
also Motion to Arnend Civil Rights Comnplaint, filed April 21, 2008 and anginenled to the record 
piirsLlallt to the Court's J~ily 30, 2009 Order Granting Molioit to Augnlent the Record). On July 
I ,  2008, Respondents filed their Answer to Arneilded Complaint and Jury Demand. (R., p. 44). 
011 November 21, 2008, the Respondents filed their inotioli for summary judgment, along 
with supporting affidavits. (See R., p. 5; Exs. 1-4). The Lightners then filed a response to the 
sunlmary judgment nlotioll, wllicl~ was followed by a reply fiom the Respondents. (R., p. 54; 
Ex. 7). The district co~11.1 held a hearing on December 22,2008. (Tr., pp. 32-78). On January 
29, 2009, the district court issued its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgnient. (R., p. 71). The Lightners filed a nlotion for reconsideration on February 12, 2009, 
which was denied by the district court 011 March 13, 2009. (See July 30, 2009 Order Granting 
Motion to A~ignient he Record, items 4-7). 111 tlze interim, the Lightners filed a Notice of  
Appeal on March 11, 2009. (R., p. 84). This was followed by an Aniended Notice of Appeal, 
filed on March 23, 2009. (R., p. 103). 
C. Statement of Facts 
William Lightner is an Idaho state prisoner in the c ~ ~ s t o d y  of the Idaho Department of 
Cot-rection ("IDOC"). (R., p. 32,1/ 1; Ex. 4, Ex. D thereto). At ail times relevant to this action 
he was incarcerated at the Idaho State Correctional Institution ("ISCI"). (Id.) The details of  
William Lightner's criminal history and current crime of convictio~~ are detailed in Lightizev v. 
State, 142 Idaho 324, 127 P.3d 227 (Ct. App. 2005). Williain Lightner is inarried to Marcia 
Lightner. (R., p. 33,li 10). 
In 2005, William Lightner was placed on parole. (R., Ex. 4 , 1 6 ;  and Ex. D thereto). He 
subsequently absconded supervision and fled to Belize. (R., Ex. 4,1/ 6). Upon his return to 
IDOC custody, Mr. Liglltner was housed at ISCI fioin October 27, 2005 until May I ,  2008, when 
he was transfel-red to the Idaho Correctional Center ("ICC"). (R., Ex. 4, Ex. D thereto). 
On April 10, 2007, Marcia Lightner was arrested on felony charges for harboring a felon, 
in violation of Idaho Code 9 18-205. (R., p. 33 ,7  11; Ex. 3, Ex. A thereto). As a result of Mrs. 
Lightnel-'s arrest, Randy Blades, tlie ISCI warden at tlie time, teriiiiiiated her visiting privileges. 
(R., p. 33,B 12; Ex. 4, 1 7). Defendant Steve Nelson did not participate in the decision to 
tel-minate Mrs. Liglllner's visiting privileges. (R., Ex. 4,1/ 12, Ex. G thereto (# 000016); Ex. 3, 
Ex. B illereto (Interrogalory No. 1)). In July 2007, Warden Blades reinstated Mrs. Lightner's 
visiting privileges. (R., Ex. 4,1/ 7). In August 2007, Warden Hardison replaced Warden Blades 
at ISCI. ( l r i )  
On October 1 ,  2007, Warden Hardison ter~ilinated Mrs. Lightner's visiting privileges 
based on her previous arrest and unresolved criminal charges. (R., Ex. 4 , 7  8). The Lightners 
visiting privileges were also ternlinated based on William Lightner's history of absconding the 
country while oil parole, aloiig with a variety of past visiting issues involvillg the Lightners. (Id., 
7 8 9 )  Defendant Steve Nelson did not participate in the decision to teiminate Mrs. Lightner's 
visiting privileges. ( 1 2 The Lightners were both given 11otice of Warden Hardison's 
decision oti October I ,  2007. (Ill., 1 8). 
The lDOC has a prison grievance process. (R., Ex. 2, Exs. A-C thereto). William 
Lightner failed to exhaust the grievance process relating lo visitation issues prior to filing this 
lawsuit. (R., Ex. 2, 1 13). 
11. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAI, 
The Lightners identify four issues on appeal. Appellants ' BsieJ p. 5. Respondents restate 
those issues as follows: 
I )  Did the district court err in disnlissing Willian~ Lightner's claims based on his failure 
to exhaust the IDOC grievance process? 
2) Did the termination of the 1,ightners' visiting privileges violate their constitutional 
rights? 
3) Did the district court err in disinissiilg Marcia Lightner's loss of consorti~~m claim? 
4) Did the Lightncrs fail to preserve their retaliation and double jeopardy claims on 
appeal? 
111. STANDARD O F  REVIEW ON APPEAL 
As recently explained by the Idalio Supreme Court in Citibn~zlc (South Dalcotn), NA.  v. 
Ccc/.~-oll, 2009 W L  4067870, " 2 (Nov. 25, 2009): 
When reviewing the grant of a niotion for summary judgment, this Court applies 
the same standard used by the district court in ruling 011 the motion. Van v. 
Portri,ez$Mecl. Cir., 147 Idalio 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). "Summary 
judgment is properly granted w l i e ~ ~  'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no ge~luiiie issue as to 
any ~ilaterial fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law."' Icl. (quoting Idalio R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The burden of demonstrating the 
absence of a gen~~ine  issue of niaterial fact is on the inoving party. Icl. This Court 
must corrstrue the record in favor of tlie nonlnoving party, drawing all reasonable 
inferences in that party's favor. Icl. If a court finds that reasonable minds could 
differ on co~iclusioils drawn fiom the evidence presented, tlie motion must be 
denied. Icl. However, the nonmoving party must respond to the lvotion with facts 
that specifically show there is an issue for trial; the showing of a mere scintilla of 
evidence will be insufficient to meet that burden. Id. The denial of a motion for 
reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 560, 212 P.3d at 990. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The district court properlv dismissed William Lightner's claims based on his failure to 
exl~aust he IDOC erievance process. 
1 .  Prisorz Litigatiorz Rcjor111 Act 
The Ligl~tners brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 9 1983. (R., p. 33). Pursuant to the 
Prison Litigation Refonu Act ("PLRA"), "[n]o action sliall be b r o ~ ~ g l ~ t  \vith respect to prison 
conditions ~ ~ n d e r  section 1983 ofthis title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 
ally jail, prison, or other coi~ectional facility  until such administrative remedies as are available 
are eslia~tsted." 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Ili forlei 11. N~lssle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002), the United 
States Supreme Court expressly stated that "the PLRA's exha~~stion requiremellt applies to all 
inmate suits about prison life, whetlier they involve general circu~nstances or particular episodes, 
and wheilier tliey allege excessive force or some other wro11g." Id. at 532. The S~~pre lne  Court 
lias also lleld that where an inmate seelts money damages for a prison conditions claim, he or she 
must complete the prison adtnillistrative process for the claims, eve11 if the process does not 
provide for money damages. Booth v. Clmrizer, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). The prison administrative 
process is sufficient if it "could provide some sort of relief 011 the complaint." Id. at 734. 
An inmate mrrst exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit; exhallstion 
cannot be accomplished d ~ ~ r i n g  a suit or after a suit has been filed. See McKinney v, Cclreji, 31 1 
F.3d 1 198 (9"' Cir. 2002) (suit disillissed without prejr~dice where prisoner attempted to exhaust 
administrative remedies during pendency of suit.) "A stay of the suit pending exhaustion does 
iiot satisfy the plain language of t l ~ e  statute." Mubar-ak v. Cc~lifomia Dept, of Corrections, 315 F. 
Supp.2d 1057, I060 (S.D. Cal. 2004). Additionally, "[a] grievance obviously cannot exhaust 
administrative relnedies for clainls based 011 events that have not yet occurred. Nor does a 
grievance exha~lst administrative remedies for all future complaints of the same general type." 
Ross 11. Cozriit)~ ofBei~iialillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 11 88 (loL1' Cir. 2004). 
In two recent cases, tile United States S~~preme Cot11-t clarified the lna~ldatory nature of the 
PI.RA's exliaustion requirement. 111 ljVOocIjo~clii. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006), the Supreme Court 
Ireiterated that propel- exhaustion of the grievance process is required under the PLRA. As explained 
by the COLI?: "The benefits to exhaustion can be realized only if the prison grievance system is 
given a fair oppo~?unity to consider the grievance. The prison grievance system will not have such 
a11 oppo~tunity ~lnless the grievant complies with the systenl's c~itical procedural rules." Id. at 95. 
The Supren~e Court specifically rejected any notio~l that prisoners get to decide whether or not to 
follow Lhe grievance process. 
For example, a prisoner wishing to bypass the available administrative remedies 
could sin~ply file a late grievance without providing any reason for failing to file 
on time. If the prison then rejects the grievance as untimely, the prisoner could 
proceed directly to federal C O L I I ~  ... We are confident that the PLRA did not create 
s ~ ~ c l l  a tootl~less cheme. 
In Jones 11. Boclc, 549 U.S. 199 (2007), the Supreme Court addressed several issues. 
Specifically, the Court reemphasized that "[tlhere is no question that exhanstion is mandatory 
~ ~ n d e r  the PLRA and that unexhausted claiins cannot be brought." Id at 21 1 (citing Povtev v. 
Nzls.sle, 534 U.S. at 524). The Court also confirined "that failure to exhaust is an affinnative 
defense under the PLRA." Joizes, 549 U.S. at 216. (See R., pp. 28, 50). The Supreme Court 
further clarified that "[tlhe level of detail necessary in a grievance to compIy with the grievance 
procedures will vary from system to system and ciain1 to claim, but it is the prison's 
renuirements, and not Lhe PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion." Jones, 549 
U.S. at 218 (enlphasis added). As explained below, because Willia~n Lightner failed to comply 
with the PLRA's exhailstion requirement, the district court properly disinissed his claims. 
I n  addition to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, the Ida110 Habeas Corpus and 
Institutional Litigation Procedures Act (the "Act"), Idaho Code $ 19-4201, el seq., also requires 
administrative exhaustion. 111 particular the exha~~stion requirelneilt is set forth in Idaho Code 5 
19-4206, whicii states: 
( I )  Unless a petitioner who is a prisoner establishes to tile satisfaction of the court 
that lie is in imminent danger of serious physical injury, 110 petition for writ of 
habeas colpus or any other civil action sliall be bro~iglit by any person 
confined in  a state or county institution, or in a state, local or private 
con.ectional facility, with respect to conditions of confinenlent t~ntil all 
available adlninistrative reniedies have been exhausted. If tlie institution does 
not have a systeni for adlninistrative remedy, this reqi~ire~nent shall be 
waived. 
(2) At the time of filing, the petitioner shall submit, together with the petition for 
writ of habeas corpus a true, correct and co~nplete copy of any docu~nentation 
which demonstrates that he has exhai~sted adnlinistrative remedies described 
in s~ibsection (1) of this section. ~, 
(3) If at [he time of filing the petitio~l for writ of habeas coipus the petitioner fails 
to C O I ~ I P I ~  w~th this sectlon, the court shall dismiss the petition wit11 or . . 
witho~it prejudice. 
(empliasis added). As clearly stated by this section, a prisoner in any civil action is required to 
exllal~sl all of his available adniinistrative re~i~edies before filing the action. Dreizizon. v. Idc~lzo 
Siciie C'orl.ecrioi~cii l~lsr., 145 Idaho 598, 603, 181 P.3d 524, 529 (2007). Failure to f~~lfi l l  the 
exhaustion requirement inandates dismissal. 
3. The ZDOC GTier~flnce Process 
The IDOC has an administrative grievance system available to all inmates. This system 
has been in  effect at all times relevant to this action. The details of the IDOC grievance system 
are set forth in the Affidavit of Jill Whittington (including exhibits) (R., Ex. 2). That process is 
si~mmilrized as follows: 
The IDOC grievance process is a tlxee-step process. An iiunate lnust co~nplete a11 tlvee 
steps in order to exhaust the admiliistrative grieva~ice process. The first step in the process 
requires the inlnate to attempt to resolve the issue inlbrrnally by submitting a "concern fonn." If 
tlie i s s ~ ~ e  is not resolved infomally, the inmate can proceed to the second step, which is 
submitting a grievance fonn. 
The grievance form is reviewed by the grievance coordinator to malte sure it is properly 
co~~?pleted. The grievance coordinator then logs the grievance and provides the grievance form 
io [lie most appropriate staff inember, other than tlie one who responded to the concern fonn, for 
a response. The staff member's respoiise is then forwarded to the reviewing autliority, usually a 
deputy warden, for review and decision. At this point the grievance form containing the 
I-esi~onses of tlie staff member and reviewing authority are logged and returned to the inmate. 
I f  the inmate is unsatisfied with the reviewing a~~thority's decision, he may proceed to tlie 
third siep by filing a grievance appeal. The grievance appeal is logged and forwarded to the 
appellate authority, usually the warden, for a final decision. The grievance policy also provides 
that "[t]he appellate a~~t l~or i ty  ma certify the grie~iaace to the Director or other Division 
AtIn1inist1-ator wlieli iii the opinion of the appellate authority the resolution to the grievance is 
beyond the appellate authority's control." (R., Ex. 2, Exs. A-C tllaeto, pp. 4,7, mid 12, 
respectively). The grievance form, including the appellate a~itliority's response, is then returned 
to h e  inmate, completing the grievance process. 
4. Discnssiorz 
Marcia Lightner's visiting privileges were suspended on October I ,  2007. (R., p. 33, 7 
I 4). Pursuant to tlie IDOC grievance policy in effect at tlie time, William Lightner had fifteen 
days to file a grievance. (R. ,  Ex. 2,  Ex. B thereto, p. 5).' Even assuming that Willialu Lightner 
was granted an extension of time to file a grievance, he was still required to exhaust the 
gl-ievancc process before filing this action. In other words, Willia~n Lightner was required to 
exhaust the grievance process no later than January 14, 2008. As established by the record, 
William Lightner failed to s~~bliii[  any grievances relating to visitation issues at any tilne during 
2007 through January 2008. (R., Ex. 2 ,7  13). Because William Lightner failed to submit any 
grievances, let alone exhaltst the grievance process, his claims were properly dismissed by the 
district court 
The Lightners argue that William's claiins are not barred due to his failure to exl~aust he 
IDOC $1-ictalici: pi.occss, instead, they contend that he was not required to exhaust the grievance 
process because there was no procedure for him to challenge Warden Hardison's decision 
lcriiiinaiiiig Marcia Lightner's visiting privileges. hl other words, because Warden Hardison was 
the "appellate ai~tllority" under the grievance process, and he had already made the decision to 
terminate tlie Ligl~tners' visiting privileges, i t  was pointless to file a grievance. Lightners' 
argLlment is witlloul tilerit for several reasons. 
I This timekame was s~ibsequently increased to thirty days. (R., Ex. 2, Ex. C thereto, p. 5) 
As a pl-eliminai-y mattet- it is interesting to note that in their Amended Civil Rights 
Complaint, the Lightners aiirntativeiy allege that they "have exha~isted the prison grievance 
systein." (R., p. 4 2 , l  41). However, on appeal they contradict themselves by clainling that 
Wiliia~n was not required to exhaust the grievance process. See Wyatt v. Terlzune, 315 F.3d 
1 108, 1 1 I9 (9"' Cir. 2003) ("In deciding a nlotion to dismiss for a failure to exha~lst llolljudicial 
remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.") 
Turning to the s~~bstailce of Lightnel-s' argument, there is nothing in the IDOC grievance 
policy that prohibits an offender fro111 grieving a warden's decision. (See, R. Ex. 2). Although 
the appellate authority is typically the warden, there is nothing in the grievance policy preventing 
an orfender from filing a grievance regarding the warden. Any attempt by the Lightners to read 
s~ich a prohibition into the policy should be rejected. As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
iVooc@rd v. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 95 (2006): "The benefits to exhaustion can be realized orlly if the 
prisoli grievai~ce systenl is given a fair oppol-tunity to consider the grievance. The prison 
grievance system will not have such an oppo~-t~illity ullless the grievant colnplies with the 
systein's critical procedural rules." Because Mr. Lightner was not prohibited from filing a 
grievance regal-ding Wal-den Hardison's decision, he was required to exhaust the grievance 
process. It is also inlportant to recognize that "exhanstion allows prison officials an oppoltunity 
to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into 
cout~." Joiles I), Rock, 549 U.S. at 204 (2007). In this case, exhausting the grievance process 
woi~ld have given Warden Hardison the opportunity to reconsider his decision. Instead, Mr. 
Lightner iinilatet.ally decided to bypass the grievance system. However, as explained by the 
IJiiited Stales Supreme Court, prisoners are not entitled to make that decision. Wooclford, 548 
U.S. al 95. 
Additionally, lo ilie extent Warden Hardison may have liad some type of conflict of 
interest due to heins hofli tile subject of the grievance and the appellate authority, the IDOC 
grievance policy provided that: "The appellate authority may certify the grievance to tlie Direct01 
01. otlier Division Adminislraior when in the opinion of tlie appellate authority the resolution to 
the grievance is beyond tlie appellate authority's control." (R., Ex. 2, Exs. A-C thereto, pp. 4, 7, 
and 12, respectively). Had Willialn Liglitner followed the grievance process, Warden Hardison 
would liave liad ail opporti~nity to refer the matter to another authority if he deemed it necessary. 
(Tr., p. 40, L. 21-p. 42, L. 5; p. 76, L. 11-p. 77, L. 15). However, rather than following the 
grievance process as I-equired, Mr. Lightner decided to disregard the rules. 
The Lightners also attempt to argue that William was told by a correctional officer that he 
coiild iiot grieve a warden's decision. Ap/,ellnnts ' Bricj; p. 16. However, this asse~tioii s based 
O I I  ~~~;i~lii i issil~ic Iic; is;ly aiiil iacl<s roilndation. (TI., p. 75, Ls. 12-24). Instead, as properly 
detel-mined by tlie district court, William Liglltner was familiar with tlie grievance process, but 
si~nply failed to avail himself of it with regard to his clai~ns in this action. (R., pp. 74-75). 
B. The  termination o f  the Lightners' visiting privileges did not  violate anv o f  their 
constitutional rights. 
The ii~~idan~eiital cl iin asserled by the Lightners is that the terlnination of Mrs. Lightner's 
visiting privileges violated their constitutional lights. As established above, William Liglitner's 
clainis are bar[-ed as a result of his Cailure to exlia~~st tile D O C  grievance p r o c e ~ s . ~  Therefore, to the 
extent that either of the Lightners nlay assertany claims in this lawsuit, Marcia Lightner would be 
tlie only one allowed to proceed. However, as explained below, the denial of Marcia Lightner's 
visitins pi-ivileges did not violate any of her constitutional rights. 
As a preliminary matter, i t  is iiliportant to point out that the Ligiltners do not challenge 
tlie district coiirt's decision dismissing Brent Reinlte and Steve Nelson. Rlzend v. Hartforcl Ins. 
Co of the Micll,i~est, 135 Idaho 446,452, 19 P.3d 760, 766 (2001) ("Tllis Court will not review 
iss~tes not presented in the statelnent of issues or argiled by either party in their briefs.") The 
Liglitiicis did i ~ u t  i.aisc [lie dis~iiissal  defendants Reiillte and Nelson in their statement of 
issues, nor did they present any argu~uent in their brief. Accordingly, the Liglitners have waived 
any challenge to the disnlissal of these defendants. Therefore to the extent, any claim may 
s~rvive ,  i t  woi~ld olily be against Warden Hardison. Unfortunately, Warden Hardisoii died on 
May 3, 2009. (http://www.ler.acv.com/obituaries/idahostatesma~~/obiti~ary,aspx?n=iohn-phili~- 
~ i ~ l j ~ ~ ~ & l ~ i d = l 2 7 0 1 7 8 6 8 ) .  
Tluorrglroat this action and on appeal, the Light~lers have repeat.edly argued that they have a 
liberty or property interest in visiting each other, thereby entitli~ig them to due process protections. 
Wit11 (regard to tlie Ligirtners' due process claim, the district court explained: 
Protected liberty interests "may arise from two sources-the Due Process Clause 
itself and tlie laws of the States." KJJ. Dep 't oj'Cori~ectiorzs v. T l ~ o ~ ~ ~ p s o n ,  490 U.S. 
454. 460 (1 989) (quntiilg ife~vitl I? Xel/?zs, 459 U.S. 460 ( I  983)). "The D L I ~  
Process Clause oftlie federal constitution does not, of its own force create a 
2 Even if Willianl Lightner did exliaust the grievance process, or was excused from doing so, his 
claims would still fail based 011 the salile reasons explained below. 
liberty inlet-est.. ., for it is well settled that ail ililiiate does not have a liberty 
interest in tlie denial of contact visits by a spouse, relatives, children, and friends." 
Block v. Ruthe~foforcl, 468 U.S. 576 (1984). The denial of a prisoner's access to a 
particular visitor "is well within the tertns of confinenie~~t ordinarily colltelnpiated 
by a prison sentence." Tl~onz~son, 490 U.S. at 461 (qzlotiizg Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 
468). 
However, state statutes or reg~llatiorls can create a due process liberty interest 
where none otherwise would have existed. Tlzonzpson, 490 U.S. at 461. For a 
state law to create a liberty interest, it must contail1 "explicitly lila~~datory 
language." Tlionzpson, 490 U.S. at 463 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472). 
(R.,  pp. 77-78). This due process a~lalysis was subseque~~tly modified by the United 
Statcs Supretile Cout-1 and followed by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
111 Scliei~ers v. Stcrle, 129 Idaho 573, 930 P.2d 603 (1996), the Idaho Supreme Court 
specifically adopted the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sc~nclin 1). Conner, 515 U.S 
472 ( I  995). As recognized in Sckevefors, Snrzdbi clarified the standard for deteriniiiing when a 
prisoiier has a prolecled liberty interest: 
. . .  we recognize that States inay under certain circumstances create liberty 
interests whicli are protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will 
be genet-ally lilnited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the 
sentence ill S L I C ~  a11 ~iliexpected maliiier as to give rise to protection by the Due 
Process Clause of its own force, rroiietheless imposes an atypical and significant 
hardship on tlie inmate in relatioil to the ordinary incidents ofprison life. 
Schevers, 930 P.2d at 606, cili~ing Sr~ncliii 1). Coniter, 115 S. Ct. at 2300 (citations omitted). 
As exj,lail~ed by the court in f4'are v. Momison, 276 F.3d 385, 388 (8"' Cir. 2002): 
Olily sanctions that impose atypical and significant hardships upon a prisoner in 
relation to the ordinary restraints and incidents of prison life iinplicate tlie Due 
Process Cla~tse. Scmdirin. 515 U.S. at 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293. The suspe~~sion f 
Ware's visitatio~i privileges wit11 respect to his wife and two other wolneil does 
no1 impose ~tpoli Ware ail atypical and sigiiificailt hardship. Accordiilgly, the 
suspensio~i of'tliese visitation privileges without affording Ware a hearing would 
11ot iilfi.inge Ware's due-process rights even if in fact the warden had ordered the 
suspension as pitnish~~ient for Ware's involveinent with his visitors in s~nuggli~lg 
forbidden goods illto the prison. 
It is therefore clear that the terminatio~l of the Light~lers' visiting privileges did not 
impose an  atypical and significa~it hardship, and thus did not implicate due process 
protecttons. Accord~ngly, the Lightt~ers were ilot ent~tled to due process ill coniiection 
with tlie termination of their visiting privileges. 
Furthennore, Idaho Board of Correctioll Rule 604: "Nothing i11 Section 604 establishes a 
right to visit any inmate. Nothing in Section 604 should be interpreted as an expectation that 
visitation will be approved between any person and any ininate if the Department has suspended, 
tenuina~ed, or revolted a visitor or inmate's visiting privileges." D A P A  06.01.01.604.01. 
Liltewise, Rule 604 states that "[i]nniate visitation is allowed at the discretion of  the facility head 
or designee." (Icl.; R., pp. 78-79). Therefore, it is clear that the IDOC's visiting policy does not 
cl-eate any due process right in visiting. To the contrary, the Board of Correction's rule expressly 
dispels any such notion. Coilsistellt with this rule, the IDOC visiting policy provides: 
Visiting privileges may be terminated at the discretion of the facility head or 
designee for any length of time, i~icludiilg permanently, for violati011 or attempted 
violation of any state or federal law, any Board rule, Policy and Procedure, SOP, 
field memoranda, or failure to follow staff iilstructio~ls. 
(I<., Ex. 4, Ex. C thereto, p. 6 )  (e~i~phasis added). That policy further grants the facility head, i.e., 
wal-deli, tlie d1scretio11 to deny visitation requests of family members with a felo~ly arrest within 
the last five years. ( 1 ,  p 0 )  Mrs. Liglitner was arrested in April, 2007 on a felony charge for 
hat-bol-ii-ig a Celon. (R., Ex. 3, Ex. A thereto). 
As explained by the United Slates Supreme Court, "[aln iiunate does not retain rights 
inconsistent with proper incarceration. And, as our cases have established, freedoin of 
association is among the rights least colnpatible with incarceration. Some curtailment of that 
freedom must be expected in the prison context." Ol~erton v. Bnzzettn, 539 U.S. 126, I31 (2003) 
(citations omitted). At i s s ~ ~ e  in Overton were several prison visitation restrictions. In 
deiernlii?i~ig whether ihe various restrictions were constitutional, the Supreme Court held that the 
appropriate test was whet he^. "the challenged reg~~lations bear a rational relation to legitimate 
penological interests." 539 U.S. at 132. However, the Court cautioned that "[wle must accord 
substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a 
significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for 
ileicrmining the most appropriate n~eans to accompiisl~ thein." Id The Court then decided that 
whether visiting regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests requires an 
application ofthe four-part test established by the Court in Turner v. SaJIey, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
As explained by the Court in Overton: 
i n  T1.1.rner we held that four factors are relevalit in deciding whether a prison 
reg~ilatioil affecting a constitutio~lal right that survives incarceration withstands 
constitutional challenge: whetl~er the regulation has a "'valid, rational 
connection"' to a legitinlate governmental interest; whether a l t e~~~a t ive  means are 
open to innlates to exercise the asserted right; what impact an accon~~nodation of
the right would have on guards and inmates and prison resources; and whether 
there are "ready alternatives" to the regnlation. 
Overton, 539 U.S. at 132 (citing T~~rrrer, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91). Applying the Turizer factors to the 
visiiation restrictions at issue in Overton, the Supreme Court concluded that the restrictions were 
constitutional, as they were rationally related to legitimate pellological interests. Overtor?, 539 
U.S. at 132. As explai~led below, the same co l~c l~~s io l~  is colnpelled in the present case. 
As a poini of clarification, it is importailt to recognize that regardless of the constitutional 
source of Marcia Lightner's claims,' the Turner allalysis applies. "The status of a person as a 
prisoner or non-prisoner does not deter~nine wlletl~er the Tzirlrizer test applies to prison regulations 
that 1nay affect both prisoners and non-prisoners." Rice v. Kenzplzer, 374 F.3d 675, 681 (8"' Cir. 
2004); Tlzon~bzcrglz v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,411 11. 9 (1989) (rejecting "any attempt to forge 
separate standards [apart from firmer] for cases implicating the rights of outsiders.") In 
Overton, the visiting regulations were cilalienged by both prisoners and their non-prisoner 
visitors, who asserted violations of their First, Eighth, and Fourteentl~ Amendment rights. In 
analyzing tl~ese claims, the Supreme Court applied the Tzimer test without distinction. Overton, 
539 U.S. at 131-32. As explained more recently in Von Minden v. Jankowski, 2007 WL 1958615 
(W.D. Tex. 2007), "regardless of whether the Plaintiffs rely on the Fourteentl~ (due process or 
equal protection clauses) or First Anendnle~lt in this case, the Court will apply the same test to 
detelinitle whether the Visitation Policy is constitutional: whether the Visitation Policy is 
'reasonably related to legitimate pellological iilterests'." Id., at * 8 (citing Turner v. Snfley, 482 
U.S. 7 8 ,  89). 
As indicated above, the first Turner factor requires a detellnination of whether the 
chailellged restriction is ratiollally related to a legitiinate pellological interest. 111 this case, the 
' For example, Mrs. Lightner asserts violatioi~s of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendn~ents, along wit11 the Idaho Constilution. (R., p 35, 71 15). 
iegilimate penological interest in support of Warden Hardisoil's decisioii to deny Marcia 
Lightner's visiting privileges was protecting the sec~~rity of the i~istitutioi~ and preveilting 
disruption in the visiting area. (R., Ex. 4,a 8). I11 Overiorz, the Supreme Court stated that 
maintaining internal prison security was "perhaps the most legitimate of penological goals." 539 
U.S. at 133. As explained by the district court, "MarciaLiglitner was arrested for the feloliy 
offense of harbori~ig a Lelon in violation of Idaho Code 5 18-205." (R., p. 72). Likewise, the 
district court fo~iiid that "[tlhe Lighlners have a history of violati~ig facility policies." (R., p. 72). 
Some examples include inappropriate colttact with each other, inappropriate clothing, 
intel-ference wit11 other visitors, improper use of a parking space, aiid hostility toward staff. (R., 
pp. 72-73). As fo~llid by the district court: 
Preveilti~lg an iil~nate from visiting with someone accused of harboring a f~~gi t ive  
serves the legitimate penological purpose of protecting the security of the 
institution. Preventing visits which habitually create a disturbance serves the 
legitimate penological ptrlpose of nlilli~~sizi~lg disruption in the visiting area. The 
COLII? finds that Warden Hardisoil was acting with the pe~lological purpose to 
preserve the safe, secure, and orderly operatioil of the facility. 
(R., p. 79). 
Throughout the Aliiended Co~iiplaiiit, Mrs. Lightner repeatedly contends that termillation 
of her visiting privileges was improper because she had not yet been convicted of a crime. (See 
R . 13. 37). Howevel., this is a distinction without a difference. As explained by the court in Von 
The fact that Plailitiffs were pretrial detainees who had not been convicted of ally 
crimes at the ti111e they were denied visitation privileges does not mean that they 
were 1101 a seci~rity i.isIc. As the Supreine Court has stated, "[tlhere is 110 basis for 
coiicludi~ig that pretrial detainees pose ally lesser security risk than co~ivicted 
inina~es" and "[ilndeed, it may be that in certain circ~~n~stances they present a 
greater risk to jail security and order," includi~~g "a greater risk of escape than 
other inmates." 
lioi7 Minde11, 2007 W L  1958615, " 9 (2007) (quoting Bell IJ. WolJsiz, 441 U.S. 520,547 11. 28 
( 7 9 ) )  In the present case, Marcia Lightner's arrest was for harboring a convicted felo~l who 
had escaped from IDOC custody. This fact, combined with Willianl Lightiler's prior attempt to 
flee supervision by leaving the country only emphasizes the security risk the Lightners presented. 
Accordingly, visitation restrictions based a visitor's crilninal history (including arrests) are 
rationally related to the legitinlate penological goals of maintaining the safe, secure, and orderly 
operation of the prison; atid preventing future crime. Therefore, the termination of Marcia 
Lightner's visitation privileges satisfies the first Turner factor. 
The second Tunier factor asks whether there are alternative means for exercising the 
asserted right. As explained by Warden Hardison, the Lightners still had the availability to 
communicate wit11 each other through letters, telephone calls, and through other visitors. (R., Ex. 
4 ,  1 0  I11 Overtorz, the Coui-t held that alternative forms of colninunication such as letters and 
lelephone calls were sufficient. 539 U.S. 126, 135. The district coul-t found that these same 
alternative forms of conl rn~~~~ica t io~l  were available to the Lightners and had been found to be 
sufficient by the Silprenle Court in Overton. (R., p. 80). The Court explained in Overton that 
"jajlkrnaiives io visilalio11 need not be ideal, however; they need only be available." 539 U.S. at 
139. Based on this reasoning, there is no basis for reaching a different co~lclusion in the present 
case. 
TIic tliii-d T L I I . I I ~ I .  [actor req~iires ali inquiry in to the impact that accommodating the 
Lighiners visits would have on prison resources. As explained by Warden Hardison, allowi~lg 
sonle fo~m of closely mo~litored, non-contact visits was not practical, based on li~nited space 
availability and because i t  would require the co~n~ni tme~i t  o f a staff lnember to be posted near the 
Liglltners during their visits. (R., Ex. 4, 1 ould inlpose more than a 
de il~iriiniis cost on ISCI resources because it would esse~ltially prevent that staff member fiom 
perfoiiuing otiier functions or being in another location during the visits. (Id.) This would also 
redilce the ability of other offenders to have visits. With respect to this factor, the district court 
Eotind that "even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaiiltiffs, the evidence shows 
that an attempt to accon~niodate the Lightners could have been unreasonably time co~isumi~lg 
ii~ld b~~rdensorne on ihe facility and the other i~~lnates." (R., p. 80). Eve11 assuming that allowing 
the Lightners to visit each other would not impose more tha11 a than a cle nziizinzis cost on ISCI 
resources, thal does not nlean that the restriction is invalid. Miclier~elcler v. Stlniiier, 860 F.2d 
328, 331 11. 1 (9'" Cir. 1988) ("Not all four factors will be relevant to each case.") Furthe~~nore, 
Lhe Supreme Court has cautioiled that courts should be " 'particularly deferential' " to prison 
adiiiinistrators' j ~ ~ d g ~ n e n t s  regarding this determination. Overton, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (citing 
T~.rrilci., 482 U.S. 78, 90). 
The last Tzrr17e1. factor aslts ''\\/Iiether the presence of ready alternatives undermines the 
i.easonableness of the reg~tlations." Overton, 539 U.S. at 136. As explained by the Court, 
"Tzc~vier does not impose a least-restrictive-altel~lative test, but asla instead whether tile prisoner 
has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that fully acco~nmodates the asserted right 
while not imposing Inore than a cle niii7ii?zis cost to the valid penological goal." Icl. This factor is 
closely linked with the third Turner factor, disc~~ssed above. See Wii-schiiig v. Coloraclo, 360 
F.3d 1191, 1201 (1 0''' Cir. 2004) (analyzing third and fourth Turner factors together). With 
respect to this factor, courts sho~ild again "accord substantial deference to the professional 
ji~clgment of prison adininistrators in defining the legitinlate goals of a coi~ections ystem and 
cleternlining tile most appropriate means to accon~plish theill." Doe v. Donahue, 829 N.E.2d 99, 
l I 0  (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Overton, 539 U.S. at 132). Based on the reasons explained 
above, there were no ready altelllatives to the visitation restriction imposed by Wardell Hardison. 
With respect to this point, the district court concluded that "Plaintiffs have provided no such 
alternative nor does one seem to exist within the limited resources of the IDOC." (R., p. 80). 
Even assunling S L I C ~  alternatives existed, that alorle wot~ld not be enough to overcolne the 
legitimate penological pulpose served by the restriction, particularly wile11 appropriate deference 
is given to the prison administrators' judgment. 
As a resi~lt of the foregoing analysis, i t  is clear that the tennination of Marcia Lightner's 
visiting privileges was rationally related to a legitimate penological interest, and therefore did not 
violate any of her alleged constitutional rights. Accordingly, the district court did not err in 
granting summary judg~nent in favor of the Respondents. 
Altenlatively, tlie district court properly determined that Warden Hardison was entitled to 
qualified immi~nity iregarding his decisioll to terminate the Light~~ers' visiting privileges. (R., pp. 
80-81). The Lightners do not cllallenge this decision 011 appeal, and have therefore waived the 
issiie. See Rheud v, I f ~ ~ r ~ o r d I ~ i s .  Co. ofthe Miclwest, 135 Idaho 446, 452. 
C. The district court did not err in dismissing Marcia Lightner's Ioss of consortium claim. 
Tiic Iigiitiicrs co~itciid that the iermination of their visitiiig privileges resulted in a loss of 
consortium. (R. pp. 35-38) "'The clai~ii for loss of consortium is a wliolly derivative cause of 
action contingent Lipon a third party's tot-tious i11.jury to a spouse.' . . . A loss of consortium claim 
is necessarily depe~ident up011 the iiijured spouse's success or failure in the uiiderlyilig claim 
against the third party." Zc~lehct v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tztclcer, Cl?tcl., 131 Idalio 254, 256, 953 
P.2d I363 (1 998) (quoting Runcorn v. Shearer Lunzber Procls., Inc., 107 Idaho 389, 394, 690 
P.2d 324 (1 984)). In the present case William Liglitiier failed to e x h a ~ ~ s t  the grievance process, 
and therefore is barred fro111 pursuing any claims. Because Marcia Lightner's loss of colisortiuin 
ciai~n is contingent upon the success of Willia111 Lightner's claim, it is also barred. 111 other 
words, because William Lightner's underlying claims are barred by his failure to exhaust the 
~i'ii.\-i~iicc: pl-ocess, lie has no chance of stlccess 011 those claims. Consequently, Marcia 
Lightner's loss of consoi-tiuiii clainl is also barred. Ful-thelmore, "COLII-~S have allnost 
i ~ n a n i ~ i ~ o ~ ~ s l y  denied derivative Ioss of consortium clai~ns based on the violatioil of  the spouse's 
civil rights." Jereminh 11. Ynnlce Machine Sliap, Irzc., 131 Idaho 242, 249, 953 P.2d 992 (1998) 
(denying loss of consorti~~ln claim in actioii for violatioli of Idalio Human Rights Act). The 
district court properly applied the foregoiilg authority in this case when it concluded that "[elven 
irM1-. Lightner's claim were iiot barred by his failure to exliai~st adlninistrative remedies and if 
that claiin were to have succeeded, a loss of consortiu~ii claiin based up011 alleged violation of 
civil rights rails as a matter of law." (R., p. 82). 
D. The Ligl~tners failed to preserve their retaliation and double ieopardy claims on appeal. 
Tlte Lightners conteild that the district court failed to nile on their retaliation and double 
jeopardy claims. Appellc~i~ts'BrieJ pp. 33, 41. Before an appellal~t may assert a11 issue on 
appeal, lie must obtain ail adverse ruling 01.1 that issue fro111 tlie trial court. State v. Fisher, 123 
Idaho 48 I, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993) ("We will not review a trial court's alleged error oil 
appeal  inl less tlie record discloses an adverse r~~liizg which fo~nls  the basis for the assigunent of 
error."); Slaie v. Hesler, 1 14 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 27 (1 988) (Idaho Supreme Court wotild not 
I-eview ciaini wliere appellant liad not obtained ruling fsorn trial court); State v. Kellji, 106 Ida110 
308~  276-77. 678 P.Zd 60, 68-69 (CL. App. 1984) (failure to obtain a nzling on an issue below 
prevents appellate review abseut showiug of fuiidamental error). Because the Lightners failed to 
obtain an adverse ruling from the district court on these claims, they bave not been preserved for 
appeal. 
Even if ihe Ligl~tiiers ]>ad properly preserved these claims on appeal, they would 
nonetheless be subject to dismissal. With respect to the Lightners' retaliation claim they co~lteild 
tl~i!l tile tem?ii,ation of their visiting privileges was another act in a sequence of retaliatory 
actious taken against tlzem over the past twelve yeas  by IDOC officials. See Appellants' BrieA 
pp. 31 -38. A retaliation claiin IIILIS~ allege the following: "(1) Au assertion that a state actor took 
sonie adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and 
that such action (4) hamled tlie prisoner and (5) was not rial-rowly tailored to advance a 
legitimate correctioiiai goal." Rhocles v. Robinson, 380 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9"' Cis. 2004). 
In iiiis case, there are no facts in tile record to suppori a retaliation claim. Instead, 
tl?roughout their brief, the Liglit~iers refer to alleged facts and events that are not properly in the 
record and should not be considered by the Court. Additionally, the Lightners' factual 
allegations lacic foundation, are speciilative, and consist of hearsay. As s~ich, their factrial 
allegations are insufficient to prevent summary judgineiit. FurtIie17nore, there is 110 evidence in 
the record that Warden Hardison's decision was based on ally retaliatory motive. Instead, as 
pi-operly detemiined by the districi court, Warden Hardison's decisioii was in f~utlierance of a 
legitinlate pe~iological purpose. Finally, tlie district court dete~lnilied that Wardeli Hardison was 
entitled to q~ialified iiiimunity. (R., pp. 80-81). Tlie Lightners have not challenged that decision 
on appeal. Based on these reasons, tlie Lightners' retaliation claim is without merit. 
With regard to the Lightners' dortble jeopardy claim, they contend that because their 
visiting privileges had been previously suspended, it was a violatio~i of double jeopardy to 
telininate their privileges a second time. Appellaizts'BrieJ pp. 39-40. "The Double Jeopardy 
Ciause of the Fifth Aii~endment provides that 'no person shall be . . . subject for the same offense 
iu hi: I\.\ icc piii i l l  jcopiil-dy of  lifc 01- liilib.' This c l a ~ ~ s e  protects against a second prosecutioli for 
the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, aiid 
111~11iiple pi~nisllrnents for the saille offense." Gibsoiz v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 276, 108 P.3d 
41 7, 423 (Ci. App. 2005) (citelions omitted); (Tr., p. 75, Ls. 4-1 1). It is undisputed that the 
le~n~inalion r the Lightners' visiting privileges did not constitute a second prosecution after 
acq~~ittal  or conviction, nor did it impose inultiple punishmei~ts. Instead, tlie telmination was the 
resi~lt of a discretionary administrative decision. As such, Lightners' double jeopardy claim fails 
as a lliatter of law 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based 011 the foregoing reasons, the Respondents ~.espectf~~lly request that the Court 
aff i r~n the d~stricl court's order granting su~ninary judgment in their favor 
Respectflilly s~~binitted this ____ of December, 2009. 
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